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Obama  cares  about  visuo-spatial  attention:  Perception  of  political
figures  moves  attention  and  determines  gaze  direction
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• Peripheral  target  detection  (E1)  and  saccadic  free-choice  (E2)  tasks.
• RT  facilitated  for  Democrat  (Republican)  cues  when  target  appeared  left  (right).
• Saccades  following  Democrat  (Republican)  cues  more  likely  directed  left  (right).
• Concepts  not  directly  associated  with  physical  space  bias  spatial  processing.
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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Processing  an  abstract  concept  such  as  political  ideology  by itself  is  difficult  but  becomes  easier  when  a
background  situation  contextualizes  it.  Political  ideology  within  American  politics,  for  example,  is  com-
monly  processed  using  space  metaphorically,  i.e., the political  “left”  and  “right”  (referring  to  Democrat
and  Republican  views,  respectively),  presumably  to  provide  a common  metric  to  which  abstract  fea-
tures  of  ideology  can be grounded  and  understood.  Commonplace  use  of  space  as  metaphor  raises  the
question  of whether  an  inherently  non-spatial  stimulus  (e.g.,  picture  of  the  political  “left”  leader,  Barack
Obama)  can trigger  a spatially-specific  response  (e.g.,  attentional  bias  toward  “left”  regions  of the  visual
field). Accordingly,  pictures  of  well-known  Democrats  and  Republicans  were  presented  as central  cues  in
peripheral  target  detection  (Experiment  1)  and  saccadic  free-choice  (Experiment  2)  tasks  to  determine
whether  perception  of  stimuli  lacking  a direct  association  with  physical  space  nonetheless  induce  atten-
tional  and oculomotor  biases  in the  direction  compatible  with  the  ideological  category  of  the  cue (i.e.,
Democrat/left  and Republican/right).  In Experiment  1, target  detection  following  presentation  of  a  Demo-
crat  (Republican)  was  facilitated  for targets  appearing  to  the  left (right).  In  Experiment  2,  participants
were  more  likely  to look  left  (right)  following  presentation  of  a Democrat  (Republican).  Thus,  activating
an  internal  representation  of  political  ideology  induced  a shift  of attention  and  biased  choice  of  gaze
direction  in  a spatially-specific  manner.  These  findings  demonstrate  that  the link  between  conceptual
processing  and  spatial  attention  can  be totally  arbitrary,  with  no  reference  to physical  or symbolic  spatial
information.
Published  by Elsevier  B.V.
1. Introduction
In American politics, the term “left” is associated with lib-
eral perspectives and Democrats, whereas “right” is associated
with conservative perspectives and Republicans. This spatial
metaphor for ideology is largely an arbitrary artifact of legislative
∗ Corresponding author at: 238 Burnett Hall, Department of Psychology, Univer-
sity of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588, United States. Tel.: +1 402 472 0547.
E-mail address: mark.mills2@huskers.unl.edu (M.  Mills).
seating arrangements in 18th Century France [1,2]. Supporters
of the French Revolution sat to the left of the president of the
National Assembly whereas supporters of the king sat to the right.
The terms “left” and “right” have been used since as descriptive
terms for opposite ends of ideological and political spectrums, even
though the actual spatial elements of the original seating arrange-
ments have long since been abandoned. The left/right distinction
in present day politics differentiates ideological views, but there
is no spatial association with the physical left/right. Nonetheless,
as the metaphor used to represent the concept of ideology relies
on remote associations between semantic labels and space, it is
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bbr.2014.09.048
0166-4328/Published by Elsevier B.V.
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Fig. 1. (a) Typical trial sequence in Experiment 1, (b) Democrat cues, (c) Republican cues, (d) Mean RT and standard deviation for Democrat and Republican cues as a function
of  target location (left/right) and SOA.
possible that activating an internal representation of ideology
induces neural activity associated with the processing of spatial
information.
One consequence of processing remote spatial associates of ide-
ology may  be a corresponding spatial bias in perceptual processing
associated with visual attention, such that activating a representa-
tion of the political left biases processing of “left” regions in the
visual field whereas activating a representation of the political
right biases processing of “right” regions. Previous work indi-
cates that activating internal representations of space generate
covert shifts of attention to specific regions of the external visual
field. For example, perceiving numbers shift attention to regions
of space consistent with numerical magnitude (e.g., low num-
bers shift attention leftward, whereas high numbers shift attention
rightward; [3]). Furthermore, there is evidence that more abstract
concepts, but still closely associated with physical space, also gen-
erate covert shifts of attention. For example, Chasteen et al. [4]
presented central cues relating to the concept of divinity (e.g.,
“God”, “Devil”) and found that peripheral target detection was  facil-
itated when a target appeared at a location compatible with the cue,
despite the cue being spatially non-predictive of target location:
God-related words facilitated detection when the target appeared
above fixation and Devil-related words facilitated detection when
the target appeared below fixation (see also [5]). These studies
indicate that spatial information permeates abstract concepts, sug-
gesting the possibility that abstract concepts, however remotely
associated with space, should also induce a corresponding spatial
bias in perceptual processing.
Another consequence of processing remote spatial associates of
ideology may  be a corresponding spatial bias in the choice of where
to look, such that activating a representation of the political left
biases the direction of gaze toward “left” regions of the visual field
whereas activating a representation of the political right biases the
direction of gaze toward the “right”. The pre-motor theory of atten-
tion [6] holds that spatial attention involves the pre-programming
of eye-movements toward the attended region. Given that con-
ceptual processing affects the direction of spatial attention (e.g.,
[3,4]) and that eye movements and spatial attention are tightly
linked (e.g., [7]), concepts influencing attention should also influ-
ence choice of gaze direction. In support, Ruiz-Fernàndez et al.
[8] presented a small or large number flanked by two  faces and
instructed participants to “explore the scene”. They found that par-
ticipants looked left (right) following the presentation of a small
(large) number, indicating that number magnitude causally affects
the choice of gaze direction (see also [9–11]).
The purpose of the present study is to examine whether expo-
sure to figures with differing ideology influences the direction
of spatial attention and choice of gaze direction. Specifically, we
sought to determine whether perception of well-known political
figures is associated with a spatial bias to process and direct gaze
in a manner consistent with the ideological category of the politi-
cal figure. Participants were presented with a central cue stimulus
(picture of either a Democrat or Republican political figure). Experi-
ment 1 used a peripheral target detection task in which a target was
presented to the left or right of the cue with a variable stimulus-
onset-asynchrony (SOA) and a simple target detection response
was required. Unlike abstract cues such as “God” and “Devil”, which
have a tight coupling with the physical space of up/down in many
religions, an image of an individual (e.g., Obama) independent of
any mention of political affiliation does not have a direct con-
nection with directionality. Therefore, we  are able to determine
whether remote spatial associations between Democrat/left and
Republican/right trigger corresponding shifts in spatial attention
such that targets following a Democrat would be detected faster
when presented to the left versus right, whereas targets follow-
ing a Republican would be detected faster when presented to the
right versus left. Experiment 2 used a free-choice task in which
participants freely viewed the cue before making a volitional eye-
movement to either a left or right placeholder of their choosing to
determine whether participants would look left (right) following
the presentation of a Democrat (Republican).
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Students from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln participated
in either Experiment 1 (N = 72) or 2 (N = 34). All had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and were naïve to the purpose of the
experiment.
2.2. Stimuli and apparatus
Cues were colored photographs of eight different well-known
political figures (see Fig. 1), four of which were Republican (George
W. Bush, Dick Cheney, John McCain, Sarah Palin) and four of which
were Democrat (Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Al Gore, Hilary Clinton).
In Experiment 1, stimuli were 3.0◦ in diameter. In Experiment 2,
stimuli were 208 × 175 pixels. Stimuli were displayed on a Pentium
IV PC with VGA monitor (85 Hz) in a dimly lit, sound attenuated
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testing room. Participants were seated approximately 44 cm from
the monitor. In Experiment 2, eye-movements were recorded
using an SR Research Ltd. EyeLink II system (Mississauga, Ontario,
Canada), which has high spatial resolution and a sampling rate
of 500 Hz. Thresholds for detecting the onset of saccadic move-
ments were accelerations of 8000◦/s2, velocities of 30◦/s, and
distances of 0.5◦ of visual angle. Movement offset was  detected
when velocity fell below 30◦/s and remained at that level for 10
consecutive samples. Each participant underwent a nine-point cal-
ibration procedure followed by a nine-point calibration accuracy
test. Calibration was repeated if any point was in error by more
than 1◦ or if the average error for all points was greater than 0.5◦.
Viewing was binocular but only the dominant eye was recorded.
2.3. Procedure: Experiment 1
A typical trial sequence is shown in Fig. 1a. Each trial started with
the presentation of a central fixation point (black, 1.0◦ in diameter).
Participants were instructed to fixate this point and to not move
their eyes for the duration of the experiment. Following a period
of 750 ms,  a cue (Republican/Democrat) was presented at fixation
and remained visible through the end of the trial. Participants were
instructed to ignore the cue as it was irrelevant to their task and
did not predict the location of the upcoming target. A variable cue-
target SOA of 100, 500, or 800 ms  preceded target presentation.
The target (a black circle subtending 1.0◦) appeared either 6◦ to the
left or right side of fixation with equal probability and participants
were instructed to press the spacebar as quickly as possible once the
target was detected. The target remained visible until a response
was made. The next trial began 1000 ms  after a response. There
were 288 experimental trials.
2.4. Procedure: Experiment 2
To initiate each trial, participants were required to press the
spacebar while fixating a central fixation point (black, 1.0◦ in
diameter), after which two square flanking placeholders were
presented. Placeholders were outlined in black and filled with
white, each subtending 2◦ of visual angle. After 500 ms,  a cue
(Republican/Democrat) replaced the central fixation point. The
center-to-center distance between cue and placeholder was  6◦.
Participants were instructed to freely view the cue as they nor-
mally would and then to simply direct their gaze at one of the
square placeholders whenever they saw fit. Though the direction
of the saccade was up to the participant, everyone was  instructed
to avoid always making the same response (e.g., always directed
rightward) and to avoid any specific pattern of response (e.g., con-
tinually alternating left/right). The end of the trial was triggered by
the first saccade landing within a 175 × 175 pixel invisible bound-
ary surrounding each placeholder. There were 240 experimental
trials.
3. Results
Considering that political figure cues were intended to trig-
ger spatial biases associated with the concept of ideology, it was
important that participants actually had knowledge of the political
figures and their respective affiliation. Therefore, after completing
the experimental task, participants were asked to identify each
of the eight political figures by name. Responses were recorded
as correct/incorrect, with total number correct serving as a proxy
of political knowledge. In Experiment 1, 45 participants (63%)
correctly identified six or more political figures whereas 27 par-
ticipants (37%) correctly identified three or less, a clear bimodal
distribution. In Experiment 2, the total number of correct responses
was far more evenly distributed (Fig. 2). This difference is likely due
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Fig. 2. Frequency distribution of political knowledge in Experiment 2.
to recency/frequency effects on recall induced by the timing of data
collection: Experiment 1 was collected Winter-2009, just months
removed from the 2008 Presidential election, whereas Experiment
2 was collected Fall-2014, over 2 years removed from the 2012
Presidential election. In any case, as the distribution of political
knowledge in Experiment 1 suggested that knowledge naturally
clustered into two  groups (knowledgeable and unknowledgeable),
only knowledgeable participants (i.e., those able to identify at least
six figures) were included in the analysis reported for Experiment
1. As the distinction between knowledgeable and unknowledge-
able was not apparent in Experiment 2, political knowledge was
submitted as a covariate (centered at 6).
3.1. Experiment 1
Person mean RT was analyzed with a 2 (Cue: Demo-
crat/Republican) × 2 (Target: left/right) × 3 (SOA: 100, 500, 800 ms)
repeated measures ANOVA. RTs less than 100 ms  or greater than
1000 ms  were excluded from analysis (0.8%). Mean RT in each
condition is shown in Fig. 1d. Overall, RTs decreased monoton-
ically with increasing SOA, as evidenced by a significant main
effect of SOA, F(2,88) = 65.12, p < .001. The critical Cue × Target
interaction was significant overall, F(1,44) = 13.17, p < .001. The
three-way interaction was  marginally significant, F(2,88) = 2.62,
p = .07, attributable to the Cue × Target interaction being signifi-
cant at the 500 ms SOA, t(44) = −3.88, p < .001, SE = 5.21, but not
at the 100 or 800 ms  SOAs (p > .10). At the 500 ms  SOA, the crit-
ical Cue × Target interaction indicates that when the cue was  a
Democrat, RTs were faster to left versus right targets, t(44) = 2.54,
p = .01, SE = 4.16, d = .38, whereas when the cue was a Republican,
RTs were faster to right versus left targets, t(44) = −2.33, p = .02,
SE = 4.16, d = .38. Thus, target detection following presentation of a
Democrat was facilitated for targets appearing to the left whereas
target detection following presentation of a Republican was facil-
itated for targets appearing to the right, despite the fact that
Democrat/Republican cues were spatially non-predictive of target
location.
3.2. Experiment 2
As gaze direction was a dichotomous outcome (leftward or
rightward saccade), a generalized linear function modeling the logit
of the probability of a rightward saccade was  selected for analysis.
Parameter estimates, therefore, are presented on the logit scale,
which is unbounded and symmetric around zero. A logit of zero
means that first-saccade direction was  equally likely to be directed
rightward as leftward. Note that a logit of 0 is equivalent to a prob-
ability p of .50—i.e., p = exp(logit)/[1 + exp(logit)]. When the logit
is positive, a rightward saccade is more likely to occur than not
(p > .50); when the logit is negative, a rightward saccade is less
likely to occur than not (p < .50). Analyses were performed on the
full data matrix, with dependency among observations controlled
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Table  1
Intercept estimates, standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals for Democrat and Republican political figures as a function of political knowledge, as well as the slope
parameter estimate, standard error, and 95% confidence intervals for the mean difference between Democrat and Republican political figures as a function of political
temperament. Note that values are given on the logit scale.
Political knowledge Democrat Republican Diff. (Dem − Rep)
Est. SE 95% CI Est. SE 95% CI Est. SE 95% CI
3 0.52 0.29 [−.05, 1.08] −0.01 0.25 [−.52, .50] 0.53 0.31 [−.08, 1.14]
4  0.31 0.21 [−.11, .73] 0.21 0.19 [−.18, .59] 0.10 0.22 [−.36, .56]
5  0.10 0.16 [−.23, .42] 0.42 0.15 [.13, .72] −0.33 0.17 [−.68, .03]
6  −0.11 0.16 [−.44, .21] 0.64 0.15 [.35, .94] −0.76 0.17 [−1.11, −.40]
7  −0.33 0.20 [−.74, .09] 0.86 0.19 [.48, 1.24] −1.18 0.22 [−1.64, −.73]
8  −0.54 0.26 [.02, .37] 1.08 0.25 [.57, 1.58] −1.61 0.29 [−2.22, −1.01]
Note: Bold values indicate significance (p < .05).
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Fig. 3. Model predicted mean probability of a rightward saccade for Democrat and
Republican cues (black lines). Observed proportion of rightward saccades for Demo-
crat and Republican cues (gray lines).
directly through inclusion of random effects [12]. Point biserial cor-
relations, rpb, are reported as estimates of effect size. Trials with
three or more saccades on the stimulus were omitted from analy-
sis (1.4%). Two subjects were removed from analysis because >99%
of saccades were directed in the same direction. As can be seen in
Fig. 3, in which the observed proportion of left/right saccades is
plotted against model fits, it is evident that the model adequately
captured the overall trends in the data.
Estimates of the intercept for each Cue, as well as the slope
term for the mean difference between them, are presented in
Table 1 as a function of Political Knowledge. Overall, the grand
mean of the logit of the probability of a rightward saccade (M = .26,
SE = .13) was significantly greater than zero, t(29.9) = 2.10, p = .04,
rpb = .01, indicating that rightward saccades were more likely to
occur than leftward saccades, indicative of a general rightward
bias. The main effect of Cue, F(1,27.5) = 19.15, p < .001, indicates that
rightward saccades were more likely to occur following a Republi-
can (M = .64, SE = .15) versus Democrat (M = −.11, SE = .16). The main
effect of Political Knowledge was not significant, F(1,29.7) = .01,
p = .97; however, there was a significant interaction of Cue and
Political Knowledge, F(1,27.2) = 18.74, p < .001. The pattern of this
interaction can be seen in Fig. 3, which shows that the likeli-
hood of a rightward saccade increased with Political Knowledge
for Republican cues, t(29.8) = 2.61, p = .01, rpb = −.19, but decreased
with Political Knowledge for Democrat cues, t(28.4) = −2.32, p = .03,
rpb = .19. In other words, as Political Knowledge increased, saccades
tended to be directed rightward following a Republican and left-
ward following a Democrat.
4. Discussion
In Experiment 1, target detection following presentation of a
Democrat (Republican) political figure was facilitated for targets
appearing to the left (right) of the figure. Thus, merely perceiving
an image of a political figure induced a covert shift of attention to
a specific region in the visual field consistent with the ideology of
the political figure. These results demonstrate that abstract concep-
tual stimuli influence attentional allocation even when not directly
associated with physical space. Similarly, Experiment 2 showed
that participants were more likely to look left (right) following the
presentation of a Democrat (Republican), demonstrating that per-
ception of an image of a political figure causally biased the choice
of gaze direction in a manner consistent with the ideology of the
political figure. These results demonstrate that abstract conceptual
stimuli influence free-choice of response even when not directly
associated with physical space.
Importantly, the present study demonstrates that the link
between abstract conceptual processing and spatial attention can
be totally arbitrary, with no reference to physical or symbolic
spatial information. Previous studies examining the influence of
conceptual thinking on spatial processing have used conceptual
stimuli that have a relatively direct association with a ‘physical’
spatial location. For example, the concept of number [8] and divin-
ity [4] have relational associations in that a given item occupies a
particular location relative to another item (e.g., “1” is before “2”;
“God” is above “Devil”). This is not the case for political figures
(e.g., perceptual aspects of Obama do not “place” him before/after
or above/below Bush). The present study, therefore, provides strong
evidence supporting the idea that spatial information deeply per-
meates abstract concepts.
The fact that political figures make no reference to physical
or symbolic spatial information is relevant to the current debate
regarding whether conceptual cueing effects may  be accounted
for by polarity benefits (default asymmetries in the way people
process categorical dimensions). Specifically, it has been suggested
that task-induced associations between categories and target loca-
tions may  explain conceptual cueing effects (e.g., [13–15]). Though
this account cannot entirely be ruled out, it is difficult to see how it
could account for the present results given that (a) participants sim-
ply viewed political figures without evaluation, making it unlikely
that participants treated the figures as a single binary variable [16],
and (b) there were multiple categories to which a figure potentially
belonged (e.g., gender, race, age), which likely reduced the extent
to which polarity benefits could have emerged [5]. Similarly, it has
also been suggested that an association between abstract concepts
and locations might be grounded in terms of the co-occurrence
of these concepts in language (e.g., Goodhew et al., 2014). This
alone, though, cannot account for why  merely perceiving an
image of a political figure is sufficient to activate shifts of spatial
attention.
The present results are in line with the pre-motor theory of
attention [6], which holds that covert spatial attention activates
motor routines in oculomotor brain regions (e.g., superior collicu-
lus) that execute saccades to the attended location. Given that
Experiment 1 demonstrated that cue ideology shifts spatial atten-
tion, the effect of cue ideology on gaze direction in Experiment 2
is likely mediated by such an attentional shift. An important impli-
cation is that the oculomotor system may  be especially useful in
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uncovering the mechanisms that relate the concept of ideology and
spatial attention.
The fact that stimuli that are not inherently directional can
bias attention by evoking learned spatial associations has impli-
cations both in terms of how these biases are generated and for
the relationship between attention and action. For instance, in
a neurophysiological study investigating the influence of evalu-
ation on action, McCall et al. [17] demonstrated a link between
affectively-valenced attitudes and motor responses, such that
spatially-specific premotor activity (namely in dorsal premotor
cortex and posterior superior parietal areas) was  triggered by
the mere appearance of a stimulus that evoked an attitude that
had been previously associated with a particular response. As
these areas have also been implicated in arbitrary sensorimo-
tor mappings between sensory stimuli and motor responses,
McCall et al. concluded that attitudes trigger action through
learned stimulus-response associations instantiated by neural
mechanisms responsible for arbitrary sensorimotor mechanisms.
The present results extend McCall et al. by suggesting that
spatial attention may  play a role in contributing to these pro-
cesses.
Spatial metaphors such as the left/right distinction in politics
are useful because they provide a common metric, physical space,
to which abstract information can be grounded and therefore com-
municated to others [18]. The present findings show that abstract
conceptual stimuli affect attentional allocation and the choice of
gaze direction even when not directly associated with physical
space. Thus, the relationship between perception of abstract con-
cepts and spatial attention may  offer a framework that grounds
abstract thinking in spatial processing.
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